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IMPLEADER OF DEFENDANT'S INSURER UNDER
MODERN PLEADING RULES
WILLIAm

H. DEPARCQ*

AND CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT**

May a defendant in a negligence action implead his liability insurer under Rule 14 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, and
under the similar rule in other jurisdictions which have adopted
modern pleading? This question has been much discussed among
lawyers since the Minnesota Rules became effective.
In the first trial court decision on the point under the Minnesota
Rules, it was held that such impleader was proper. The insurance
company sought to appeal from an order denying its motion to
vacate the order allowing impleader. The present writers filed a
brief ainici curiae in which we canvassed the holdings in other jurisdictions on the procedural point involved. Since the supreme court
held, quite correctly, that an order allowing impleader, or an order
refusing to vacate impleader previously allowed, is interlocutory and
therefore not appealable,' the court had no occasion to get to the
merits of the question. But the issue is sure to come up again. With
the thought, therefore, that the cases we had collected might be helpful to other judges faced with the question, and to members of the
bar interested in its determination, we have undertaken to present
the substance of our brief in this Article.
At the outset we note that this problem can arise only in that
limited class of cases where the insurer has disclaimed liability and
refused to defend on behalf of the defendant insured. If the insurer
is conducting the defense, it is hardly likely to seek to implead itself; and any attempt by the insured to implead the insurer who has
not disclaimed liability would clearly be a breach of the "cooperation" clause of the policy of insurance.
When the problem is thus delimited, its answer is as clear as
*Member, Minnesota Bar. Chairman, Minnesota State Bar Association
Committee on Court Rules. It hardly need be said that this Article speaks
only for the individuals who have written it, and indicates nothing as to
the views of the Court Rules Committee.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Secretary, Minnesota State Bar Association Committee on Court Rules. Assistant to the
Reporter, United States Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of
Civil Procedure.
1. Luethi v. Stanko, 61 N. W. 2d 522 (Minn. 1953). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has reached the same result under statutes similar to those
of Minnesota and involving the same fact situation, viz., an order refusing
to dismiss a third party complaint against defendant's insurance company.
Petersen v. Falzarano, 6 N. J. 447, 79 A. 2d 50 (1951). The court buttressed
its conclusion that the order was not appealable by pointing out that impleader of the insurer does not deprive it of any substantial right.
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the answer to any legal problem ever can be: there can be no possible doubt but that Rule 14 does permit impleader of the insurer
who has refused to defend.
Every instinct of convenient and economical administration of
justice compels this answer. And it is equally compelled by the
unanimous teaching of the authorities. With the exception of a few
trial court decisions, which have been repudiated by the appropriate
appellate court, every American decision interpreting an impleader
rule substantially similar to Minnesota Rule 14.01 has allowed defendant to implead his liability insurer where the insurer has refused to defend.
A leading state court decision is PioneerMutual Compensation
Co. v. Cosby. 2 Defendant had impleaded his insurer under Colorado
Rule 14 (a). The insurer raised numerous objections to the impleader, among which was that the "no action" clause of the insurance policy barred this procedure. The Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed bringing in the insurance company as a third party defendant saying:
"If the Insurance Company has by its policy agreed to insure
against liability on the part of the Cosbys, or either of them, then
this third party procedure is justified and the third party plaintiffs are only seeking to compel the Insurance Company to do
that which it contracted to do but now refuses to do. * * * The
insured had a right to file a third party complaint against the
insurer to have all rights and liabilities determined in one action,
it appearing that the Insurance Company was not defending the
main action on behalf of its insured." s
A recent New York trial court decision 4 held that impleader of
defendant's insurer was "squarely within" the provisions of Section
193-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, which is substantially
the same as Minnesota Rule 14.01.5 There is dicta in a Missouri
case that the Missouri statute6 identical to Minnesota Rule 14.01,
allows impleader where the "third party is liable as guarantor,
2. 125 Colo. 468, 244 P. 2d 1089 (1952). That the public policy in
Colorado against allowing the jurors to know of the existence of insurance
is not less strong than in Minnesota is indicated by Crowley v. Hardman
Brothers, 122 Colo. 489, 223 P. 2d 1045 (1950), holding that Colo. R. Civ.
P. 18 and 20 do not permit plaintiff to join the insurer as a party defendant.
3. 125 Colo. at 471-472, 244 P. 2d at 1091-1092.
4. Koolery v. Lindemann, 91 N. Y. S. 2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
5. To the same effect see also Lecouna Cuban Boys, Inc. v. Kiamesha
Concord, Inc., 276 App. Div. 808, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 113 (3d Dep't 1949) ; J. A.
E ing & McDonald, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 193 Misc. 173, 81

N. Y. S. 2d 559 (N.Y. City Ct 1948).
6. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 507.080 (1949).
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surety, insurer or indemnifier of the principal defendant."'7 In addition, such impleader has been approved by the commentators" and
has been said to have been proper in the federal courtsY Finally, the
principal draftsman of the Federal Rules, on which the Minnesota
Rule here involved is patterned, indicated that this result should
be reached. 10
The argument has been advanced that although impleader of an
insurer may be proper in the abstract, still it is not permissible
where the policy of insurance contains either a "no action" clause
or a provision that "nothing contained in this policy shall give any
person or organization any right to join the company as a codefendant in any action against the insured to determine the insured's liability." The authoritative answer to this argument is made
by Professor Moore who says:
"The fact that the policy stipulates that no action will lie
against the insurer until judgment has been rendered against the
insured and has been paid by him is no bar to impleader: as we
have shown above third-party practice may accelerate the accrual
of a right, and its objectives would be defeated if a 'no action'
clause were held to make rule 14 inapplicable.""
7. Hipp v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 237 S. W. 2d 928, 931
(Mo. App. 1951).
S. See Holtzoff, Some Problems Under Federal Third-Party Practice,
3 La. L. Rev. 408, 411 (1941): "In those instances, which form a comparatively small minority of cases, in which insurance carriers dispute liability
on the policy, the defendant may bring in the insurance carrier as a third
party defendant in order to secure an adjudication of his rights under his
insurance policy in the same action in which his liability to the plaintiff is to
be determined." And Note, 49 Col. L. Rev. 861, 862 (1949), concludes:
"Thus, impleader of an insurer results in an appreciable saving in litigation
and will spare the insured defendant the considerable delay in securing reimbursement which would otherwise result from crowded calendars." See
also Crawford, Third-Party Practice Under the Missouri Code, 19 Kan.
City L. Rev. 16, 33-34 (1950) ; Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under
Modern Pleading Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 615-617 (1952) ; Commentary,
Impleadinq of Insurer as Third-Party Defendant, 2 Fed. R. Serv. 650
(1940) ; Comment, Estoppel, Third-Party Practice, and Insurer's Defense,
19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 546 (1952).
9. E.g., Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Ziffrin Truck Lines, 36 F. Supp.
777 (W.D. Ky. 1941), aff'd, 126 F. 2d 476 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Jenkins v. Black
& White Cab Co., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 14a.221, case 1 (D. D.C. 1953) ; Knapp v.
Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Ill. 1952).
10. Proceedings of Cleveland Institute on Federal Rules, 250-259
(A.B.A. 1938). The only contrary authorities seem to be 6 Cyclopedia of
Federal Procedure § 17.08 (3d ed. 1951), which concedes that impleader
of an insurer falls within the language of the rule, but says that "public
policy considerations may well enter in to prevent such consummation,"
though citing no authority later than 1941; and Chizik v. Fuchs, 193 Misc.
297, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 437 (N.Y. City Ct. 1947), which, as will be seen, has
been repudiated by later New York decisions.
11. 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 14.12 (2d ed. 1948).
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Two trial court decisions have rejected Professor Moore's reasoning and have held that a "no action" clause or a policy provision
against joinder of insurer, is a waiver of the right to implead the
insurance company.' 2 But the great bulk of decisions has been to
the opposite effect.
The leading case is Jordan v. Stephens,18 which has been relied
on not only in federal courts but also by the Colorado Supreme
Court. 14 In the Jordan case the court said:
"The 'no-action' clause is directly opposed to Rule 14. It
poses a question as to whether the court should permit litigants
to circumvent rules of court by contractual arrangements. Rule
14 was promulgated not only for the purpose of serving litigants
but as a wise exposition of public policy. The object of the rule
was to facilitate litigation, to save costs, to bring all of the litigants into one proceeding, and to dispose of an entire matter
without the expense and the labor of many suits and many trials.
The no-action provision of the policy is neither helpful to the
third-party defendant, to the courts, nor generally is it in the
interest of the public welfare. Its object is to put weights on the
already too slow feet of justice. Moreover, such provision, if permitted to become effective, should not operate in this case for
the reason that the third-party defendant is alleged to have
breached its contract. According to the third-party complaint,
it has declined to perform the obligation of its undertaking in
any way. It has refused to defend the defendants or third-party
plaintiffs and has declined to meet the expenses contemplated
by its contract. Under such circumstances it should not be permitted to interpose contractual provisions of a contract it has
repudiated."' 15
Similarly in another recent federal case it was said that the "no
action" clause is "unenforceable, as being against the public policy
to simplify procedure and administer prompt justice, declared in
Rule 14."' °1 The court gave as an alternative ground for its holding
the fact that the policy also contained a promise to defend on behalf
of the insured, and that the insurer was, in any event, properly impleaded because of its breach of this promise.
The cases previously cited holding that the "no action" clause is
a waiver of the right to implead were New York trial court decisions. Appellate decisions in that jurisdiction have gone the other
12. Auliso v. California Oil Co., 120 N. Y. S. 2d 582 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
Litman v. Garfinkle, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
13. 7 F. R. D. 140 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
14. Pioneer Mutual Compensation Co. v. Cosby, 125 Colo. 468, 244 P.
2d 1089 (1952). See note 2 supra and text thereto.
15. Jordan v. Stephens, 7 F. R. D. 140, 142 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
16. McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 17 Fed. R. Serv.
14a.221, case 1 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1952).
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way and held specifically that the "no action" clause is not such a
waiver of or a bar to impleader.17 These cases are said to have overruled the trial court decisions denying impleader where the policy
contained a "no action" clause.18
It has been suggested, on the basis of Anderson v. State Farit
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'0 that a "no action" clause creates
a "substantive right" which may not be affected by, a mere rule of
procedure. This suggestion requires an analysis of thie nature of
this supposed substantive right. Such an analysis was offered by the
court in a well-reasoned New York decision :20
"I think this provision, reasonably construed, means merely
that there may be no recovery against the assurer except on the
basis of a final judgment against the assured or unless the claim
has been liquidated by agreement of the parties with the consent
of the assurer. * * * Itseems to me, therefore, that the purpose
underlying the above-quoted provision of the policy is met if
at the time recovery is had against the assurer, judgment has
been allowed, even though not yet formally entered, against the
assured. The interposition of a cross complaint or of a third
party complaint under section 193-a of the Civil Practice Act, is
not in derogation of the said provision of the policy. The underlying purpose of that provision is fully achieved inasmuch as
there can be no recovery under the third-party complaint * * *
There is no reason why the loss or expense suffered by the assured, and the right of the assured to indemnity from the assurer,
may not be determined in the same action if only the assurer is
safe against the possibility that there will be recovery against it
in the absence of and before judgment is allowed against the
assured." 2 1
Finally, it has been intimated in some cases that impleader of
the insurer may prejudice it, and that this is sufficient reason for
denying such impleader though it would fall within the language of
the Rule. The argument is advanced in greatest detail by a lawyer
for an insurance company 22 who suggests that it is not necessary to
do more than "state the proposition" in order to demonstrate its
validity. The proposition does, indeed, find some support in cases
17. Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State Warehouse Corp., 276
App. Div. 611, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 738 (2d Dep't 1950) ; Adelman Mfg. Corp. v.
New York Wood Finisher's Supply Co., 277 App. Div. 1117, 100 N. Y. S. 2d
867 (2d Dep't 1950).
18. Shapiro v. City of New York, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 609 (Sup. Ct 1953).
19. 222 Minn. 428, 24 N. W. 2d 836 (1946).
20. Judy Negligee, Inc. v. Portnoy, 194 Misc. 508, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 656
(N.Y. City Ct. 1949).
21. Id. at 510-511, 89 N. Y. S. 2d at 657-658.
22. Bisselle, Impleader of Casualty Insurance Companies in New York
State, 18 Ins. Counsel J. 37 (1951).
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which have allowed impleader but have ordered separate trials of
the claim against the insurer from the principal claim, at least where
the trial is to be to a jury rather than to the court.2 Recent authorities, however, reject this line of argument. In A B & C Motor
TransportationCo. v. Moger2' the court said:
"The argument in the reply brief, that to import the insurance
company into the case may react unfavorably to this plaintiff
before a jury, is less than convincing. In this day and generation there may possibly remain a vestige of ingenuousness in the
minds of jurors concerning insurance vehicles, but I venture
to doubt it. The current facts of life, concerning the ultimate
financial responsibility involved, are pretty generally known by
personal experience or the reading of newspaper and magazine
advertising, on the part of those of sufficient intelligence to
qualify as jurors in this court. Indeed, the size of the verdicts
may not be unrelated to that awareness." 25
And in another federal case the court said, with regard to the
argument that the insurer would be prejudiced if it were known that
liability might be visited upon it:
"While there have been many judicial decisions to this effect,
beginning many years ago when automobile insurance was much
less customary, it may be doubted whether now, in view of the
fact that automobile liability insurance is so general, the rule
should be so rigidly applied * * * In case the insurer denies liability and refuses to defend the action in accordance with its
policy, I see no logical reason to deny to the insured, who is the
defendant in a suit, the right to bring in the insurer as a thirdparty defendant, where under the terms of its policy it will be
liable over to the insured defendant and where the judgment
against the defendant will establish the liability of the insurer."26
23. Remch v. Grabow, 193 Misc. 731, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 462 (Sup. Ct.
1947) ; DeLany v. Allen, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Casserta v.
Beaver Construction Corp., 197 Misc. 410, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (Sup. Ct.
1949); Kane v. Kane Ship Repair Corp., 202 Misc. 530, 118 N. Y. S. 2d

515 (Sup. Ct 1952).
24. 10 F.R.D. 613 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
25. Id. at 615. The Minnesota Supreme Court seems to take the same
attitude. Thus in Odegaard v. Connolly, 211 Minn. 342, 345-346, 1 N. W. 2d

137, 139 (1941), the court said:
"We think too much is made of the fact that parties to an automobile
collision carry insurance. It is safe to assert that the majority of every
jury, called to try such a case in the Twin Cities, comes from families
owning cars carrying liability insurance. Every person fit to be a juror
knows that none but the wholly irresponsible and reckless fail to carry

liability insurance on the car they own or drive. Owners of cars for the
protection of their families and guest passengers carry such insurance.
So long as the insurance is not featured or made the basis at the trial
for an appeal to increase or decrease the damages, the information would
seem to be without prejudice."
26. Tullgren v. jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. Md. 1939) ; cf. Jenkins
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CONCLUSION
It has been shown that courts in some twenty cases, from such
disparate jurisdictions as New York, Colorado, New Jersey, Missouri, and the federal courts, have held that impleader of an insurer
is proper when the insurer has denied liability and refused to defend.
With the exception of a few trial court decisions, now repudiated
by the appropriate appellate court, no American court has refused to allow impleader under these circumstances when it has
been governed by a rule substantially similar to Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 14.01. It may confidently be expected that Minnesota courts will continue to permit such impleader and, save under
extraordinary circumstances, will not grant a separate trial as to the
insurer.
v. Black & White Cab Co., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 14a.221, case 1 (D. D.C. 1953).
Perhaps the best analysis supporting the conclusion that no prejudice to the insurer can result from its impleader is contained in 36 Minn. L. Rev. 421 (1952) ;
and see also Comment, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 546 (1952), arguing that it is
to the insurer's advantage, in cases where he has refused to defend, to be
impleaded, and that if he is not impleaded he should seek to intervene in
the action.

